This week’s visit to Lebanon of senior Iranian politician Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, is seen as an attempt to smooth any feathers ruffled by rhetoric from Tehran about Hezbollah’s disarmament.
In early August, the Lebanese government, under pressure from the United States, announced that it would seek to disarm Hezbollah, long considered a principal ally of Tehran, by the end of the year.
The group reacted angrily to the call to disarm with its secretary-general, Naim Qassem, denouncing the idea on Friday and saying the Lebanese government “does not have the right to question the resistance’s legitimacy”.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview last week: “We support any decision the group makes, but we do not intervene.”
“This is not the first time they’ve tried to strip Hezbollah of its weapons,” he said. “The reason is clear: The power of resistance has proven itself in the field.”
His comments were received angrily in Beirut. Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji – who is from the anti-Hezbollah, right-wing Lebanese Forces party – said Araghchi’s statement is “firmly rejected and condemned”.
“Such statements undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty, unity and stability and constitute an unacceptable interference in its internal matters and sovereign decisions,” Rajji said.
Hezbollah and Iran have emerged bruised from separate conflicts with Israel in November and June, respectively. Now, Beirut’s instruction for Hezbollah to disarm risks further undermining the relevance of the group at a critical time, analysts said.
Who decides?
Many analysts believe the decision on whether to retain or relinquish its arms may not be Hezbollah’s alone.
”Hezbollah does not have complete freedom of action in this regard,” HA Hellyer of the Royal United Services Institute told Al Jazeera, referencing the group’s close ties with Iran.
“But it doesn’t act simply as a proxy for Tehran and is in the midst of a rather challenging period of its existence, especially given the surrounding geopolitics of the region,” he said of the regional upheavals since Israel began its war on Gaza in October 2023 and launched subsequent assaults on Lebanon and Syria.
Those assaults inflicted significant damage on Lebanon, principally in the southern Beirut suburbs and southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah’s support base is located.
Lebanon was already locked into an economic crisis before Israel’s war, and the World Bank estimated in May that it would now need $11bn to rebuild. The central government would be responsible for distributing that money, giving it some influence over Hezbollah.
![A woman holds a flyer with portraits of slain Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah (R) and successor Hashem Safieddine (L) at a polling station in the municipal elections in Nabatieh in southern Lebanon on May 24, 2025. [Mahmoud Zayyat/AFP]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/000_47YB2KF-1748088661.jpg?w=770&resize=770%2C513&quality=80)
“Tehran will be very opposed to Hezbollah disarming,” Hellyer said. “But if Hezbollah decides it needs to, to preserve its political position, Tehran can’t veto.”
He also suggested that Tehran may see some of its allied groups in Iraq, which Larijani visited before Beirut, more favourably now, especially since the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in December severed its land supply routes to Lebanon.
“Hezbollah is, of course, very important to Iran, but I think the Iraqi militia groups are becoming more so, particularly after the loss of Assad,” Hellyer said.
A threat and a provocation
Hezbollah has long been considered the most powerful nonstate armed actor in the Middle East, a valuable ally for Iran and a nemesis for Israel.
“Hezbollah has always been a threat and a provocation, depending on where you’re standing,“ said Nicholas Blanford, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and an authority on Hezbollah.
“It’s still both, though to a much lesser degree,” he added, noting the damage the group sustained from Israel’s attacks and the assassinations of its leadership in the build-up to and during Israel’s war on Lebanon in October and November.
“It’s clear that Iran wants Hezbollah to remain as it is and, as far as we can tell, is helping it reorganise its ranks.
“It’s also clear from their statements that Hezbollah has no intention of giving up its arms. Even relatively moderate figures within the group are comparing doing so to suicide.”
In his speech on Friday, Qassem’s rejection was unequivocal: “The resistance will not disarm so long as the aggression continues and the occupation persists.
“If necessary, we will fight a Karbala’i battle to confront this Israeli-American project, no matter the costs, and we are certain we will win,” he said, referencing the Battle of Karbala, venerated by Shia Muslims as a foundational battle against tyranny and oppression.
Qassem seemed to exclude the Lebanese military from his ire, warning the government: “Do not embroil the national army in this conflict. … It has a spotless record and does not want [this].”
Inside the tent
Larijani’s visit on Wednesday was seen as a potential opportunity for Beirut to open up new lines of communication with one of the region’s most significant actors, Tehran, and potentially determine what Iran might be willing to consider in return for Hezbollah’s future disarmament.
“It’s not possible for Lebanon to break relations between the Shia community and Iran, any more than it could the Sunni community and Saudi Arabia,” Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center said.
“Iran is a major regional actor. It has a strong relationship with one of [the two] largest communities in the country,” he said of Lebanon’s large Shia community.
“You can’t cut ties. It doesn’t make sense. You want Iranians inside the tent, not outside.”
Given the precarity of Lebanon’s position, balanced between the US support it relies upon and the regional alliances it needs, Young suggested that Lebanese lawmakers nevertheless seek an opportunity to secure some sort of middle ground while accepting that some in Beirut may not be willing to countenance any negotiations with Iran.
“It’s important for the Lebanese to see if there are openings in the Iranian position,” Young continued, casting Larijani’s visit as a potential opportunity for the Lebanese government to influence Iran’s position on Hezbollah’s future.
“And this is something Larijani’s visit, if well exploited, could provide,” he said, “It’s important for the Lebanese to see if the Iranians propose anything in the future or if they show a willingness to compromise on behalf of Hezbollah.”