Dobbs V. Jackson Women’s Health Organization | 2022, Supreme Court, & Explanation

Background

The case arose in March 2018, when the Mississippi state legislature adopted the Gestational Age Act (HB 1510), which prohibited almost all abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy—well before the point of fetal viability, which usually occurs at about 24 weeks. On the day that HB 1510 was to take effect, Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the only licensed abortion clinic in Mississippi, filed suit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the law and requesting a temporary restraining order, which was issued the following day. The district court granted the clinic’s motion for summary judgment (judgment without trial in cases where there is no dispute regarding the relevant facts and the law clearly favours one party over the other). It held that “the record is clear: States may not ban abortions prior to viability; 15 weeks lmp [last menstrual period] is prior to viability; and plaintiffs provide abortion services to Mississippi residents after 15 weeks lmp.” In addition, the court permanently enjoined the law. In December 2019 a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling as follows:

In an unbroken line dating to Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court’s abortion cases have established (and affirmed, and re-affirmed) a woman’s right to choose an abortion before viability. States may regulate abortion procedures prior to viability so long as they do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right, but they may not ban abortions. The law at issue is a ban. Thus, we affirm the district court’s invalidation of the law, as well as its discovery rulings and its award of permanent injunctive relief.

The Fifth Circuit’s ruling was then appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed in May 2021 to review the case, though it limited the issues to be decided to the single question of whether all bans on pre-viability abortions are unconstitutional. Oral arguments were heard in December.

In a brief submitted in July, Mississippi had urged the Court to overturn Roe and Casey, arguing in part that both decisions were “egregiously wrong” in finding a right to pre-viability abortion in the Constitution, where abortion is nowhere mentioned. If the Court did not wish to go that far, the state continued, it could instead hold to Casey’s “undue burden” standard while finding that HB 1510 did not impose such a burden on women seeking an abortion in Mississippi. In support of that claim, the state argued that, because Jackson Women’s Health Organization is the only abortion provider in Mississippi and does not perform abortions after the 16th week of pregnancy, the burden imposed by HB 1510 would amount to only a small reduction in the period during which a woman could obtain an abortion in the state.

Majority opinion

The Supreme Court had been expected to issue a decision in the case in late June or early July of 2022, near the end of its 2021–22 term. In May of that year, however, an apparent draft of a majority opinion in the case, written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., was leaked to the press—an extraordinary breach of the confidentiality in which the Court traditionally conducts its deliberations. The draft opinion, dated February 2022, indicated that a majority of the Court had agreed to overturn both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. As expected, the Court’s official decision, authored by Alito and issued on June 24, 2022, upheld (6–3) Mississippi’s prohibition of pre-viability abortion and took the further step of overruling (5–4) both Roe and Casey.

In his opinion, Alito agreed with Mississippi that Roe and Casey were egregiously wrong—Roe for its poor reasoning and superficial, error-filled assessment of historical evidence, in Alito’s estimation, and Casey for its affirmation of Roe’s “essential holding” (that the Constitution grants women a right to obtain an abortion prior to fetal viability) on no less mistaken grounds. Roe held that the abortion right is implicit in the right to privacy (which, like the abortion right, is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution) and that the right to privacy is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”)—though the decision also acknowledged other possible origins of the right in other constitutional provisions. Casey, for its part, took the view that the right to abortion is directly (i.e., without reference to the right to privacy) guaranteed by the due process clause.

Although substantive due process—a disputed reading of the Fourteenth Amendment whereby the due process clause is understood to protect certain substantive as well as procedural rights—has been held to guarantee a number of fundamental rights not mentioned in the Constitution (as well as various rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights, which originally applied only to the federal government), the right to abortion is not among them, Alito argued, because it does not meet either of the two relevant criteria—established and affirmed in Court rulings both before and after Roe—for inclusion in that category. Those requirements, he declared, are (1) that the right in question be objectively “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” (Washington v. Glucksberg [1997], citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland [1977]) and (2) that the right be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (Palko v. Connecticut [1937])—i.e., an essential element of liberty conceived of as consistent with the need for order in society and thus necessarily involving a chosen balance of interests.

In support of his contention that the right to abortion does not meet the first requirement, Alito observed that, until the latter half of the 20th century, when Roe was handed down, abortion was illegal in most states; likewise, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption in 1868, three-quarters of the states treated abortion as a crime in all stages of pregnancy. Moreover, he continued, abortion in at least some stages of pregnancy was considered a crime under the common law, which American law “followed…until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s expanded criminal liability for abortions.” And although punishments for abortion under the common law may have varied, common-law authorities never condoned abortion at any stage of pregnancy, much less regarded it as a right. In Alito’s judgment, Roe “ignored or misstated this history”—and Casey “declined to reconsider Roe’s faulty historical analysis”—the “inescapable conclusion” of which was that “a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions. On the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973.”

To show that the abortion right failed to meet the second requirement—that it be an integral part of ordered liberty—Alito claimed that Roe was misguided in its finding that (in its words) the right of personal privacy, which is “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty…is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Among other flaws in the Roe decision’s reasoning, according to Alito, was that the judicial precedents it cited, which recognized various rights related to sex, marriage, and family as implicit in the right to privacy or in the liberty protected by the due process clause, were not analogous to the Roe case, because none of them involved the destruction of “potential” or “fetal” life. (Such precedents included Griswold v. Connecticut [1965], which recognized the right of married couples to use contraceptives; Eisenstadt v. Baird [1972], which established the same right for unmarried couples; Loving v. Virginia [1967], which recognized a right to interracial marriage; and Meyer v. Nebraska [1923], which recognized the right of parents to control the education of their children.) The same criticism applied to Casey’s citation of judicial precedents in support of its holding that the right to abortion is implicit in the liberty of the due process clause, which it characterized in part as the freedom to make “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” and as “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Alito forcefully disagreed with Casey on this point, arguing that the posited right to autonomy is too general to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, because it “could license fundamental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like.”

Importantly, Alito’s finding that the supposed right to abortion is not fundamental entailed that legislation restricting abortion need not serve a compelling state interest, as any law impinging upon a fundamental right must do, but only that there be a rational basis for assuming that the law serves (or would serve) a legitimate state interest. According to Alito, given the legitimate state interests served by HB 1510—in the words of the Mississippi state legislature, “protecting the life of the unborn” and preventing the performance of the “barbaric” dilation and evacuation procedure for “nontherapeutic or elective reasons”—it follows that the “constitutional challenge” to HB 1510 “must fail.”

Alito’s assertion that rights not mentioned in the Constitution may be protected under the due process clause only if they are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” suggested to many legal scholars, as well as to the dissenting justices in Dobbs, that the Court’s decision would endanger the rights established in Griswold and Loving as well as other rights relating to sex or marriage that had been established in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, such as the right to consensual same-sex intimacy (Lawrence v. Texas [2003], overturning Bowers v. Hardwick [1986]) and the right to same-sex marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges [2015]). Having anticipated that objection, Alito declared that “our decision concerns the constitutional right to abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.”

Alito then addressed an inevitable (and formidable) objection to the Court’s overturning of Roe and Casey—namely, that it would violate the principle of stare decisis, whereby the stability of the law and respect for the judiciary are ideally preserved by leaving prior judicial decisions in place unless there is some compelling reason to overturn them. Although Roe and Casey had been the basis of decades of judicial precedent (Roe for nearly 50 years and Casey for 30), Alito argued that the two decisions had been so egregiously wrong that their reversal was justified. Noting that stare decisis “is not a straitjacket” that forbids the reversal of any previous ruling, Alito cited as rightly overturned decisions Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which had established the notorious doctrine of “separate but equal,” and Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), which had held that public school students could be forced to salute the U.S. flag against their (and their families’) convictions. Alito concluded that, because their reasoning was weak and because they “enflamed debate and deepened division,” Roe and Casey were equally deserving of rejection. “It is time,” he declared, “to heed the Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives.”

Concurring opinions

In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr., joined the majority on the question before the Court, agreeing that fetal viability is an arbitrary basis for determining whether a legislative restriction on abortion is constitutional and, therefore, that HB 1510 cannot be voided on such grounds. Notably, however, he disputed Alito’s pronouncement that “Roe and Casey must be overruled,” arguing that the Court had plainly gone further than was necessary to resolve the case. In his view, the Court had violated “a simple yet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.” What the majority should have done, according to Roberts, was to uphold HB 1510, on the ground that a ban on abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy still provides a woman with a “reasonable opportunity” to exercise her right to terminate her pregnancy, and to “leave for another day whether to reject any right to an abortion at all.”

Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Clarence Thomas joined Alito’s opinion in toto but also filed their own concurring opinions. Kavanaugh’s opinion was notable for his claim that the Constitution is “neutral” on the question of abortion and for his endorsement of Alito’s point that the Court’s decision did not endanger other rights relating to sex or marriage. “I emphasize what the Court today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the overruling of those precedents, and does not threaten or cast doubt on those precedents.” Kavanaugh also expressed his confidence that “other abortion-related legal questions raised by today’s decision are not especially difficult as a constitutional matter.” Specifically, as he put it, he would answer no to the question “May a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion?” and to the question “May a State retroactively impose liability or punishment for an abortion that occurred before today’s decision takes effect?”

Thomas’s concurring opinion accepted Alito’s conclusion that the right to abortion is not guaranteed by the due process clause and agreed with him that rights that do not concern abortion are not endangered by that particular finding. Thomas also argued, however, that the right to abortion and the other sex- and marriage-related rights that Alito had referred to, and that the Court had recognized as stemming from the due process clause, are questionable for another reason: namely, that the due process clause guarantees no substantive or fundamental right of any kind. Substantive due process, in other words, is a “legal fiction”—as Thomas’s concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) described it—because the due process clause refers explicitly only to the right of individuals to be treated according to proper procedures whenever the government seeks to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property. Accordingly, Thomas called for all Supreme Court decisions relying on the doctrine of substantive due process—including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell—to be overruled and for the rights they established to be reexamined to determine whether there is any support for them in other constitutional provisions.

Dissenting opinion

In a jointly written dissent, Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan castigated the five-member majority that had overruled Roe and Casey for having decimated women’s reproductive freedom by empowering state governments to force pregnant women to give birth. In the process, they argued, the majority had undermined women’s personal autonomy—robbing them of the ability to control their own bodies and to decide for themselves the course of their future lives—and had curtailed their status as “free and equal citizens.” This outcome, they added, was made plain by the fact that nothing in the majority’s opinion would be inconsistent with state laws that prohibit abortion “after ten weeks, or five or three or one—or…from the moment of fertilization” and without exception for rape, incest, or the risk of serious injury or death of a pregnant woman. Indeed, as the dissenters noted, some states had already passed such laws, which had been set to become effective as soon as Roe and Casey were overturned, and “more will follow.” Other restrictions that could be put in place in the wake of the majority’s decision, according to the dissenters, would be bans on using or receiving abortion medication (“morning-after” pills); undertaking interstate travel for the purpose of obtaining an abortion; providing information about, or financial support for, out-of-state abortions; and prosecuting pregnant women who attempted to obtain an abortion. The majority opinion, the dissenters stated, would even permit a nationwide exceptionless ban on abortion from the moment of conception.

Importantly, the dissenters also disputed the majority’s assurance that no other judicially recognized rights relating to sex or marriage were threatened by its decision. The “sole reason” for the majority’s overturning of Roe and Casey, the dissenters argued, was the “legal status of abortion in the 19th century,” or that the law at that time “offered no protection to the woman’s choice.” However, as the dissenters pointed out, the other rights in question also had not been protected (or even contemplated) during that period, so one could argue that they too should be rejected and that the Supreme Court cases in which they were recognized also should be overturned. (That Thomas’s concurrence advocated exactly that course of action demonstrated, according to the dissenters, that concern for the future of those rights was not misplaced.) It followed, the dissenters wrote, that “either the mass of the majority’s opinion is hypocrisy, or additional constitutional rights are under threat. It is one or the other.”

Finally, the dissenters accused the majority of undermining the legitimacy of the Court by demonstrating to the American public that its constitutional rights “hung by a thread”—that a mere change of membership in the Court could “expunge” the public’s constitutional rights. “In overruling Roe and Casey,” they concluded, “this Court betrays its guiding principles.” In a pointed gesture, the dissenters omitted the traditional modifier “respectfully” from the last words of their opinion, stating only “we dissent.”